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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years, computer network has widely used in almost all areas of our social 
life. It has been profoundly changing the way of our living. However, various network 
attacks have become an increasingly problem at the same time. In local area networks, 
Man-in-the-Middle attack, as one kind of ARP attack, is the most common attack.  
 
This research implemented a cross-validation based Man-in-the-Middle attack 
protection method (CVP). This approach enables a host to check whether another host 
that responds the initialising host with an ARP reply packet is genuine. It then allows 
the ARP cache table of the initialising hosts to be updated with the MAC address and 
IP address pairs of the genuine host and to place the MAC address of inauthentic hosts 
into a blacklist. 
 
This research introduced ARP and ICMP firstly, including the structure of ARP and 
ICMP packets, and their workflows. Secondly, this research discussed the types of 
ARP attacks and the existing ARP attacks protection methods, including their 
principles, applicable environment, advantages and disadvantages. Then, this research 
proposed and implemented a cross-validation based Man-in-the-Middle attack 
protection method. Simulations and experiments were performed to examine the 
effect of CVP method. The results show the effectiveness of the proposed 
cross-validation based method in protecting network from Man-in-the-Middle attack. 
Compared with the existing Man-in-the-Middle attack protection methods, CVP 
requires no extra devices and administration, leading to more secure local area 
networks and low cost. It also has made a “tabu” to attackers. That is, it places the 
MAC address of attackers into a blacklist. So they will be identified immediately if 
they try to attack the network again. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. 1 Motivation 
 
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) in any local area network (LAN) allows the host 
in the network to acquire the physical address (Plummer, 1982), known as MAC 
address, of another host in the same network to establish communications between the 
two hosts. ARP operates based on the mutual trust between the hosts and does not 
have any extra authentication measures. This exposes the hosts to ARP attacks. 
Man-in-the-Middle is a typical ARP spoofing attack. An attacker cheats a pair of hosts 
that are establishing communications by associating the IP address of the two hosts 
with the attacker’s own MAC address, so any host of the pair will regard the attacker 
as the host it wants to communicate with. The attacker can then capture the packets 
sent from one host to the other, change them and send the changed packets to the 
other host, without being recognised as an attacker.  
 
LANs are increasingly used to connect smart devices including robots, in particular, 
in domestic environments, such as smart home, to allow human users to remotely 
control the devices. The devices and the entire smart homes can become vulnerable to 
ARP attacks due to the weak security measure of ARP itself. The ARP attacks can 
cause the devices to take unauthorised actions, leading to physical and psychological 
harms to the users.  
 
LANs are also used as part of infrastructure of smart cities. ARP attacks could cause 
public services failures.   
 
The protection of network hosts from Man-in-the-Middle attacks has been studied 
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since 1997 in “ARP and ICMP redirection games” (Volobuev, 1997). Reported 
techniques include S-ARP (Mohamed, et al, 2003) and attacks detection scheme 
(Tripathy R, et al, 2007), etc. Their drawbacks are given in following: 
1. They rely on the third-party device to check each ARP packet in network. Any 
failure of the third-party device will result in an insecure network.  
2. The use of the new protocols that encrypt packets to prevent 
Man-in-the-Middle attack to replace ARP can be costly, because of the 
expensive network devices needed.  
3. The network administrator is required for binding MAC and IP addresses pairs 
in some approaches, leading to inflexibility and heavy workload.  
 
This MSc research has focused on the development of a cross-validation based 
method to protect Man-in-the-Middle attacks. In this method, there are two tables 
used to validate whether the ARP packets are genuine, Whitelist and ARP table. The 
Whitelist stores the MAC and IP addresses pairs of all “live” hosts, the ARP table 
stores the MAC and IP addresses pairs of all “live” hosts which have communicated 
previously. When having received an ARP packet, the host run this method to check 
the MAC and IP addresses pair in the received ARP packet, and to enable the host to 
update its ARP cache table or adds the pair in Blacklist, which depends on whether 
the pair can be found in Whitelist and ARP table. The advantages of this method are 
given in following: 
1. This method can fundamentally prevent Man-in-the-Middle attack. The 
function of this method is to ensure the ARP packets received in smart systems 
are genuine by cross-validation. Thus, no attacker can implement the 
Man-in-the-Middle attack by sending forged ARP packets.  
2. This method provides an uncomplicated approach to prevent 
Man-in-the-Middle attack in smart systems. When the validated result is that 
the ARP packet is genuine, the smart system starts to communicate whether 
the smart system that uses this method communicates with others depends on 
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the cross-validation. It makes the process of protecting Man-in-the-Middle 
attack uncomplicated. The cost of using this method in smart systems is also 
lower, as that the smart systems do not have to be reformed before using this 
method and any smart system can use directly. 
3. This method can prevent Man-in-the-Middle attack in smart systems by itself, 
which means there is no third-party device needed to apply in this method. 
The ARP packet sent in a normal manner, in other word, it need not be sent or 
forwarded by other devices. This makes the method more effective to prevent 
Man-in-the-Middle attack. 
 
1. 2 Aim and Objectives 
 
The aim of this research is to develop a cross-validation based Man-in-the-Middle 
attack protection (CVP) method to protect local area networks where ARP is used 
from a special type of ARP attack called Man-in-the-Middle attacks.  
 
The objectives are: 
1. To simulate Man-in-the-Middle attacks – This will confirm the mechanism of 
Man-in-the-Middle attack and its possible damages on smart systems.  
2. To design and implement the cross-validation based Man-in-the-Middle attack 
protection algorithm – This will specify the functionality of the components of 
the method and will integrate the components together to achieve the expected 
attack protection.  
3. To validate the CVP algorithm in the sense of its effectiveness – This will 
include simulation/experiment where Man-in-the-Middle attack is initialised 
in a network and the CVP algorithm is running to protect the network.  
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1. 3 Structure of Dissertation  
 
This dissertation has six chapters.  
Chapter 2 gives a literature review of the research area of ARP and ICMP. The three 
main areas of ARP include the structure of ARP packet, ARP attacks and ARP attacks 
protection. The structure of ICMP packet which can be used to simulate ARP attacks 
is also introduced in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the simulation of Man-in-the-Middle attack. There are three parts 
in this chapter. The first part is simulation environment which contains the software 
and hardware. The design of simulation of Man-in-the-Middle attack is described then. 
There are three scenarios in this part. Scenarios 1 and 2 show the processes of how an 
attacker becomes the Man-in-the-Middle between two hosts. Scenario 3 shows the 
process of making Man-in-the-Middle attacks. The third part is about how to 
implement attacks. After becoming Man-in-the-Middle, the attacker captured and 
modified packets from one host and sent a forged packet back to the host or other host. 
An attack example is also given in this part. The final part is summary which 
describes the main works of this simulation. 
 
Chapter 4 contains three parts. The first part is background of cross-validation, which 
was used to design the cross-validation. The second part is about designing the 
cross-validation and establishing two tables, Whitelist and ARP table which can be 
used to search MAC and IP address pairs. To prevent the Man- in-Middle attack, the 
design of cross-validation is to ensure that ARP packet is genuine, which means the 
MAC and IP addresses pair in ARP packet can be found in Whitelist and ARP table. 
The details of establishing Whitelist and ARP table are introduced then. Whitelist was 
established to store the MAC and IP addresses pairs of all “live” hosts which were 
obtained from gateway. The MAC and IP addresses pairs of all “live” hosts which 
communicated previously in ARP table were obtained from host’s ARP cache table. 
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The third part presents details of cross-validation implementation. The 
cross-validation was used to check whether the ARP packet is genuine, which can 
protect smart systems from Man-in-the-Middle attack. The algorithms are also given 
in this part. 
 
Chapter 5 describes the simulation of cross-validation based Man-in-the-Middle 
attack protection. The environment and process of this simulation are also described 
here. DHCP was used to issue IP addresses to hosts in this simulation. Then Whitelist 
obtained the MAC and IP addresses pairs of all “live” hosts from the lease file of 
DHCP. ARP table obtained the MAC and IP addresses pairs of all “live” hosts which 
communicated previously from host’s ARP cache table. The details of simulating 
cross-validation are given secondly. The cross-validation checked whether the MAC 
and IP addresses pair in ARP packet was genuine, which means it can find them in 
Whitelist and ARP table, and then allowed the ARP cache table to update or added the 
pair of the ARP packet in Blacklist. Simulation results are given in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 6 gives conclusions and further work. 
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2. 1 Background Knowledge 
 
2.1.1 Address Resolution Protocol 
 
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) operates in the second tier, i.e. the data-link layer, 
of Open System Interconnection (OSI) seven-layer network model. It is a highly 
efficient data link layer protocol. Its main function is to acquire MAC address based 
on the IP address it knows. It is widely used in networking smart devices, including 
robots, smart living environments such as smart house, smart city, etc. If one host 
knows an IP address and wants to communicate with another host that holds the IP 
address in the same network, it will broadcast the IP address with a request packet and 
waits for reply packet from the network. The host that holds the IP address will 
respond to the request with a reply packet containing its MAC address. When the 
requesting host receives the response, it will then use the MAC address to 
communicate with the responding host. The IP address and the MAC address will then 
be paired and saved in the requesting host’s ARP cache. Next time, if the host wants 
to communicate with the same host, it simply use the MAC address stored in its 
cache.  
 
According to the functionality, ARP packets can be classified into two types:  
• ARP request packet, used to obtain MAC address from receivers and 
containing an IP address and FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF(MAC address in ARP 
request packet) for the receiver to fill in with its MAC address. 
• ARP reply packets, used to provide MAC address and contains the sender’s IP 
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and MAC addresses. 
 
The ARP request packet and the ARP reply packet are also called broadcast packet 
and non-broadcast packet, respectively. The structure of an ARP packet is shown in 
Figure 2-1. 
OCTET/OFFSET 0 1
0
2
"Hardware type (HTYPE)"
"Protocol type (PTYPE)"
26
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
"Target hardware address (THA)"
"Target protocol address (TPA)"
"Hardware length (HLEN)"Protocol length (PLEN)"
"Operation (OPER)"
"Sender hardware address (SHA)"
 "Sender protocol address (SPA)"
 
Figure 2-1 Structure of ARP packet 
 
The meanings of fields are listed below:  
• “Hardware type (HTYPE)” -- stating the network protocol type in an exact and 
detailed way. For example, for Ethernet, it is 1. 
• “Protocol type (PTYPE)” -- specifying internet work protocol, as ARP request 
is designed differently for different internet work protocols.  
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• “Hardware length (HLEN)” -- indicating the length of a MAC address (in 
octets), which can be a router, a host, or a switch. The length is 6 in Ethernet, 
• “Protocol length (PLEN)” -- giving the length of addresses that is employed in 
the upper layer protocol (also in octets).  
• “Operation (OPER)” -- specifying operations conducted by the sender, taking 
values of 1 if the operation is requesting and 2 if it is replying, respectively. 
• “Sender hardware address (SHA)” -- containing the sender’s MAC address. 
This field contains the address of the host that sends the request if OPER = 1. 
Otherwise, it has the address of the host to which the request was sent. 
Switches take no account of this field, specifically in finding out MAC 
addresses.  
• “Sender protocol address (SPA)” -- showing internet work address of the 
sender. 
• “Target hardware address (THA)” -- containing the intended receiver’s MAC 
address. When OPER = 1, this field is ignored. When OPER = 2 this field is 
used to show the address of the host that generates the ARP request. 
• “Target protocol address (TPA)” -- providing internet work address of the 
intended receiver. 
 
 
2.1.2 Internet Control Message Protocol 
 
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is regarded as a supporting protocol in an 
internet protocol suite. Network devices employ ICMP protocol to send error 
messages. ICMP is completely different from transport protocols such as TCP and 
UDP in the sense that it is not normally used for exchanging data between network 
hosts. Besides, it is not usually employed by end-user network applications. The 
structure of ICMP packet is shown in Figure 2-2. 
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Figure 2-2 Structure of ICMP packets 
 
• Header: ICMP packet has a header containing 8-byte. The first 4 bytes of the 
header are fixed. The last 4 bytes, also known as Rest of Header, contains the 
type, code and checksum information as given below:  
o Type: ICMP type. 
o Code: ICMP subtype. 
o Checksum: specifying error checking data. 
• Data section the size of which varies and up to 32 bytes. 
 
ICMP can report errors in the following three situations:  
1) where a datagram cannot reach its destination,  
2) where a gateway does not have sufficient buffering capacity to forward a datagram, 
and  
3) where a gateway found a shorter route for a host to send messages/data. 
 
ICMP only sends the error messages to the device that sent the original data. The 
reason is that the original data can only be corrected by that device. After that device 
receiving the error messages, it can correct and determine how to resend the original 
data according to the error messages. 
0 4
0 32
OFFSET
OCTET
Rest of Header
0
1
2
3
Code
Checksum
Type
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ICMP is often used in the network, for example, the “Ping” command that checks 
whether the network is blocked. 
 
2.1.3 ARP Attacks 
 
ARP is a commonly-used communication protocol for acquiring link layer addresses 
from Internet layer addresses. When an IP datagram is sent from one host to another 
in a LAN, the IP address is always useful in finding out the destination host’s MAC 
address to perform data transmission via the data link layer. The sender usually knows 
the IP address of the destination host. When it needs the host’s MAC address, the 
sender acquires by broadcasting a request packet, known as an ARP request, to the 
LAN. As the destination host has the IP, it then replies to the sender with an ARP 
reply package including its own MAC address.   
 
ARP is a stateless protocol. Network hosts will automatically catch all ARP packets in 
all situations. Hosts will overwrite ARP entries once receiving a new ARP reply 
packet even the old ones are not yet expired. Hosts do not authenticate other hosts 
from which the packet is originated in ARP. This results in the risks of attacks. 
 
ARP spoofing attacks 
 
In principle, any host in a network can be an attacker. The reason is that there is no 
way in APR to check whether ARP packets are genuine or to confirm the identity of 
the sending hosts.  
 
APR attacks associate attackers’ host MAC address with the IP address of a target 
host. Consequently, messages that should direct to the target host are then sent to the 
attackers. The attackers can inspect the packets, can modify the packages and then 
send to the actual destination host, or can launch a denial-of-service attack by causing 
  
11 
some or all of the packets on the network to be dropped. 
 
The most common attack of ARP Spoofing is Man-In-Middle attack. An attacker 
starts from inserting itself into a network and then intercepts and forwards modified 
data to other hosts. The attacker is known as “Man-In-Middle” because it stands and 
blocks the direct communications between two hosts. The host believes the attacker is 
the host it wants to communicate when the first host is spoofed by an attacker..  
that’s how the second host is cheated by the attacker in the same way. The attacker 
captures, modifies and forwards the modified ARP packets between the two hosts to 
collect valuable information, and finally launch an attack to the host by sending 
forged ICMP packets. Man-In-Middle attack is hard to discover in network owing to 
the lack of authentication in ARP. It resembles a legitimate "transparent broker" 
between hosts’ communications. 
 
IP address conflict attacks 
 
To access the Internet, each host must have a unique IP address when using the 
TCP/IP protocol so that a host knows where packages come from and where they 
should go. IP address conflict means that the IP addresses of two or more hosts in the 
same LAN are the same. When IP address conflict takes place, the system will issue 
an error message to the host that use the same IP address. The hosts will not be able to 
use the network resources properly. 
 
As there is no security mechanism in the Internet for the default hosts to write their 
own IP address into their source IP address field, attackers can generate IP address 
conflict attacks by making forged IP addresses, pretending to be others, or by hiding 
the source IP address field. IP address conflict attack can destroy the safety and 
availability of the Internet, that is, the attackers can send requests with forging the 
source IP address as the victim's IP address and attack destination end host to respond 
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and send data to the victim. 
 
IP address conflict attack packet flow is derived from multiple locations and can be 
harmful to the data flow of the legitimate hosts, for example, the attacker can be a 
forged host, which means the legitimate host who holds the same IP address cannot 
access the Internet, so the defence mechanism can't use source IP address to filter 
attack stream. It can also make it possible to interfere with the communication 
between the two parties, which means a message’s being injected through an 
encrypted security channel makes the TCP connection be hijacked and the DNS cache 
invalid. 
 
MAC flooding attacks 
 
MAC flooding attack attacks switches by using network deception to make the MAC 
address table overflow, causing all the data frames that reach the switches being 
broadcast to the entire network which eventually leading to network congestion and 
data monitoring. 
 
In an MAC flooding attack, a switch can encounter a number of forged ARP packets, 
each of which contains a different MAC address. The effect of the attack is to 
consume the limited memory set aside in the switch through flooding the MAC 
address table with the different sources of MAC addresses.  
 
The intention of the attack from the attackers’ perspective is to push the legitimate 
MAC addresses out of the MAC address table by sending the forged ARP packages to 
the network, leading to the situation where significant quantities of incoming frames 
(packages) flood out on all ports of a network. The MAC flooding attack has its name 
from its flooding behaviour.   
  
  
13 
2. 2 ARP Attack Protection 
 
According to the types of ARP attacks, the methods of attack protection can be 
classified into ARP spoofing attack protection, IP address conflict attack protection 
and MAC flooding attack protection. 
 
2.2.1 ARP Spoofing Attack Protection 
 
The ARP spoofing attack is the problem faced by the ARP which can be replaced by 
Secure ARP Protocol (S-ARP) (Mohamed, et al, 2003). The main strategy for solving 
this problem is using Asymmetric Cryptographic Algorithm (ACA) and Digital 
Signature Algorithm (DSA) to add verification information in ARP packet. The ASA 
is a cryptography technique. ASA divides a secret key into a public key and a private 
key which are produced by DSA. The public key is assigned to the host which uses 
S-ARP instead of ARP, in the meanwhile, the ARP packet can be signed with a private 
key, and then any hosts with the public key is able to verify that the ARP packet was 
sent by some hosts possessing the corresponding private key. With ACA and DSA, 
every ARP packet in a LAN becomes more reliable, this is because the host which 
uses S-ARP instead of ARP will check the verification information, only in the case 
where the verification information is correct, the host will update its ARP table and 
start to communicate. Replacing an existing ARP protocol with S-ARP can effectively 
prevent MITM attacks, but this protection requires modifications to the existing ARP 
protocol, resulting in a heavy workload and cost.    
 
Based on Man-in-the-Middle attack, an enhanced ARP was proposed (Kim, et al, 
2010). The aim of this approach is to protect the device from Man-in-the-Middle 
attack by using a long-term ARP cache table and election mechanism. In this 
approach, every host in a LAN has a long-term ARP cache table which can store 
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MAC and IP addresses pairs for a long time. Within this table, there are MAC and IP 
addresses pairs of other hosts or gateways, which cannot be updated by ARP packets. 
If an attacker wants to send forged ARP packets to the host which has this table, the 
MAC and IP pairs cannot be changed, so the host still can communicate with reliable 
hosts. If a host which MAC and IP address pair is not in the long-term ARP cache 
table wants to communicate with the host which uses this enhanced ARP, this 
approach used election mechanism to confirm whether this host is reliable. Every host 
has unique and comparable identities which can be compared, if the host which wants 
to communicate has the higher identity, the host will be recognized as a reliable host. 
According to existing shortcomings of ARP cache, Enhanced ARP uses the Long - 
term ARP cache table to replace the existing in the ARP cache table, as well as add 
unique and comparable identity to hosts in each network. Therefore, each host is 
authenticated so as to prevent the occurrence of Man-in-the-Middle attack. But this 
method needs to modify the host and the ARP protocol and leads to large workload 
and costs. 
 
A ticket–based address resolution protocol (Lootah.W, et al, 2009) was proposed to 
replace the ARP. There are two main strategies in this approach. The first is to store 
the MAC and IP addresses pairs in a Local Tickets Agent. In addition, this agent can 
produce the Ticket Information which will be added in ARP packet. The second is to 
check the ticket information in ARP packet whenever the host receives it. For 
example, the ARP packet likes a “visitor”, if it wants to “visit” a host, it has to show 
its “ticket” to get the permission. The host will start to communicate with the host 
which the ARP packet has the “ticket”. This approach verifies ticket information 
through the ticket agent, so as to verify the reliability of the host , even to realize its 
protection. It requires the internet that employs this method to protect 
Man-in-the-Middle attack must install network ticket agent, which will cost much for 
the protection. 
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A secure ARP and secure DHCP protocol (Issac, 2009) was proposed to mitigate ARP 
spoofing attacks. In this approach, the ARP cache is stored in DHCP database instead 
of storing in the hosts. The process of communication between two hosts is, for 
example, if a host A wants to communicate with the host B, it has to send an ARP 
request to DHCP database which stores all MAC and IP addresses pairs of hosts in the 
LAN firstly, then the ARP request packet will be encrypted and forwarded to the host 
B. After the host B receiving the encrypted ARP request packet, it will authenticated 
the ARP request packet with the secret key which is set before. If the ARP request 
packet is reliable, the host B will start to communicate with the host A and send a 
confirm information to DHCP database which will update its ARP cache table. This 
approach uses a DHCP database to store ARP cache table in order to prevent ARP 
spoofing attacks happened in the hosts. This approach verifies the secret key of the 
host through the DHCP database to prevent Man-in-the-Middle attacks. It requires a 
functional upgrade of DHCP database and a transformation of DHCP protocol, which 
is impractical. 
 
A Fuzzy-Based Stateful ARP cache (Trabelsi, EI-Hajj, 2007) is an approach to prevent 
ARP spoofing attack. The stateful ARP cache is that the host will update its ARP 
cache table only after sending ARP request packet, in another word, the ARP cache 
table cannot be updated if the host does not send any ARP request packets. The Fuzzy 
Logic is used to check reliability of ARP packet. In this approach, the designer carried 
out a model to check the reliability of ARP packet, and if the probability of the ARP 
packet is over 50%, then this ARP packet is reliable. This approach replaces the 
existing ARP cache with the Stateful ARP cache, and verifies the reliability of the host 
through Fuzzy logic, thus effectively preventing Man-in-the-Middle attack. This 
stateful ARP cache solves ARP cache's stateless problem, but the changes of ARP is 
necessary which makes the cost of the method is high. 
 
A Man-in-the-Middle intrusion detection scheme (Tripathy R, et al, 2007) was 
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proposed to prevent ARP spoofing attack. In this scheme, there is a database which 
stores the entire MAC and IP addresses pairs in the LAN and two types of protocols, 
an invitation-accept protocol and a request-reply protocol. For example, if host A 
wants to communicate with host B, host A needs to send an invite message to the 
database with host B’s IP address. If there is the MAC and IP addresses pair in the 
database, the database will send an accept message to host A. The database will send a 
reply message with the MAC and IP addresses pair of the host B to host A after 
receiving the request message from host A, then the host will update its ARP cache 
table and start to communicate with the host B. This approach prevents 
Man-in-the-Middle from attacking through DHCP database and two new protocols 
mentioned above. This method presents a new network frame. Nevertheless, in the 
practical work, this new network frame’s every communication must go through two 
protocols, result in a long time to verify the reliability of the host and low working 
efficiency. 
 
2.2.2 IP Address Conflict Protection 
 
Wang and Huang (2010) proposed an approach to prevent IP address conflict attack. 
In this approach, there is a DHCP database which can check the entire ARP packet in 
the gateway. If the source MAC and IP addresses pair in the ARP packet is the same 
with in the DHCP database, the gateway will forwarded this ARP packet in the LAN. 
If it is not, the gateway will abandon this ARP packet. This method is simple and 
effective, but the transformation of DHCP database can lead to the decrease of 
network transmission speed. 
 
2.2.3 MAC Flooding Protection 
 
Based on Simple Network Manage Protocol (SNMP), an Active Defense Mechanism 
  
17 
(Wu, et al, 2007) was proposed to prevent MAC flooding attack. The main strategy of 
this approach is to use SNMP Trap to detect the MAC address of the attacker. Once 
the gateway receives many ARP request packets, the SNMP will read the MAC 
addresses in ARP request packets which will be shown in the gateway. If there are 
many same MAC addresses, it will be recognized as the attacker’s MAC address 
which will be “kicked out” from the LAN. The use of SNMP can effectively prevent 
the occurrence of MAC flooding attack. But in the case of the attacker knowing its 
protection principle, such as using different virtual MAC address in every attack, the 
effect of protection will become limited. 
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CHAPTER 3: ARP ATTACK SIMULATION 
 
 
This study aims at a new method of protecting LAN from Man-in-the-Middle attacks. 
To confirm the features of the attacks and evaluate the protection method at later stage, 
the attacks need to be simulated. This chapter gives details about how the simulated 
attacks were designed and implemented and what possible damages it can impose to 
smart systems.  
 
 
3. 1 Simulation Environment 
 
A LAN network often contains only a small number of host computers. This 
simulation designed a LAN with three hosts, including two normal communication 
hosts and one attack host that take the role of Man-in-the-Middle. These three hosts 
are connected to the same router. This design is sufficient for illustrating 
Man-in-the-Middle attacks in a LAN. The network topology is shown in Figure 3-1. 
 
The simulation software tools include Nessus and packet builder. Nessus is a 
proprietary vulnerability scanner with the functions of discovering hosts and scanning 
vulnerabilities, etc. In this simulation, Nessus was used as a network scanner for the 
attacker to scan the IP and the MAC addresses of all hosts in the network. The packet 
builder was used to acker to construct reply packets with the attacker’s own MAC 
address to respond to the unique and comparable identity of packets broadcasted by 
the hosts in the network.  
 
  
19     Figure 3-1 The network topology   3. 2 Attack design  The attacker C aims to let host A believe that C is host B and to let B believe that C is A through Man-in-the-Middle attacks. The following scenarios were designed:  Scenario 1: Host A wants to communicate with a host whose IP address = 192.168.77.129. However, host A does not know the MAC address of the host that owns the IP address 1. Host A broadcast a request packet to the network, containing the IP address 192.168.77.129.  2. Attacker C responds immediately by sending a reply packet containing its own MAC address. 3. When host A receives the reply packet, it pairs the IP and the MAC within the reply packet and save it to its ARP cache, meaning that host A believes that attacker C is the host that holds the IP address of 192.168.77.129.  
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Scenario 2: 
Host B wants to communicate with a host whose IP address = 192.168.77.128. 
However, B does not know the MAC address of the host which holds the IP address 
1. Host B broadcast a request packet to the network, containing the IP 
address 192.168.77.129.  
2. Attacker C responds immediately by sending a reply packet containing its 
own MAC address. 
3. When host B receives the reply packet, it pairs the IP and the MAC, and 
save it to its ARP cache, meaning that host B believe that C is the host 
that holds the IP address of 192.168.77.128. 
 
Now host C becomes the Man-in-the-Middle of hosts A and B. It can then send 
commands to A as it is B and to B as it is A.  
 
Scenario 3: 
Host A wants to send a command to host B. It first sends a “ping” command to 
confirm the establishment of a communication link between the two hosts.  
1. Host A sends a “ping” command. 
2. Attacker C captures the ICMP request packet and sends an ICMP reply packet. 
When host A receives the ICMP reply packet, it believes that it established the 
communication with host B.  
 
Scenario 4:  
Assume host B is a butler robot that has a database containing the personal 
information of a user. Host B is sending the username and password for the user to 
access the database to host A which is the mobile phone the user uses. Attacker C 
captures the packet after it becomes Man-in-the-Middle between hosts A and B.  
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3. 3 Attacks implementation 
 
To simulate the four scenarios and to attack hosts A and B in a network, the attacker C 
must become Man-in-the-Middle first. It can then request information from hosts A 
and B. It can also capture and modify packets from one host and send a forged packet 
to the other.  
 
3.3.1 Scanning IP address and MAC address 
 
If an attacker wants to perform Man-in-the-Middle attacks to a host, first of all, it will 
have to get the IP address and MAC address of the host. The reason for this is that 
attacker C has to know the IP and MAC addresses of the host which it wants to attack. 
 
Registering and logging in Nessus, by using the "Host Discovery", attacker C can 
scan the network and find IP address and MAC address of the hosts A and B, as 
shown in Figure 3-2. The scan result contains IP and MAC addresses of hosts A and B, 
and its own IP and MAC address. The blue strips represent the vulnerability of three 
hosts which can be used in other types of malicious attacks. If there is any 
vulnerability, the blue strip is not full of 100%. The third line is host A, the fifth line is 
host B and the sixth line is attacker C, respectively. Figures 3-3, 3-4 and 3-5 show 
their MAC addresses.  
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Figure 3-2 The scanning result of network 
 
 
Figure 3-3 MAC address of host A in scan result 
 
 
Figure 3-4 The MAC address of host B in scan result 
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Figure 3-5 MAC address of attacker C in scan result  
 
Table 3-1 summarises the IP address and MAC addresses. 
 
Table 3-1 IP and MAC addresses 
Host Name IP Address MAC Address 
Host A 192.168.77. 128 00-0C-29-6D-AC-68 
Host B 192.168.77.129 00-0C-29-07-6F-0F 
Host C 192.168.77.133 00-0C-29-96-FF-82 
 
3.3.2 Constructing and sending ARP packets 
 
To place itself in between the two hosts A and B, C sent two ARP reply packets to 
host A and host B, respectively. Attacker C generated the ARP reply packet as shown 
in Figure 3-6 and sent to host A, and the ARP packet to host B in the similar way, 
shown in Figure 3-7. 
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Figure 3-6 ARP reply packet sent to host A 
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Figure 3-7 ARP reply packet sent to host B 
 
Hosts A and B updated their ARP cache table according to the ARP reply packets sent 
by C. In this way, the host A regards attacker C as host B and host B regards attacker 
C as host A. If there are any communications between host A and host B, the packets 
will be sent to host C. Figures 3-8 and 3-9 show ARP cache table of host B before and 
after receiving the ARP reply packet from C. 
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Figure 3-8 ARP cache table before Man-in-the-Middle attack 
 
 
Figure 3-9 ARP cache table after Man-in-the-Middle attack 
 
In Figure 3-8, there are IP and MAC addresses pairs of host A and attacker C. 
192.168.77.128 is the IP address of host A, 00-0C-29-6D-AC-68 is the MAC address 
of host A. 192.168.77.133 is the he IP address of attacker C, 00-0C-29-96-F1-82 is the 
MAC address of attacker C. After Man-in-the-Middle attack, the MAC address of host 
B is changed to the MAC address of attacker C, as shown the line 5 of Figure 3-9. 
 
In this simulation, the attacker becomes Man-in-the-Middle between hosts A and B. In 
the ARP packet which attacker C sent to host B, 00-0C-29-07-6F-0F is the MAC 
address of attacker C. 192.168.77.128 is the IP address of host A, 00-0C-29-07-6F-0F 
is the MAC address of host B, and 192.168.77.129 is the IP address of host B.  
 
The MAC address of host A is changed to the same MAC address with attacker C, 
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when host A wants to communicate with the host B, attacker C carries out ARP 
spoofing by sending forged ARP packets to host A and host B continuously, which 
makes the communication between host A and host B intercepting by attacker C, more 
specifically, attacker C becomes the Man-in-the-Middle and all the communications 
between host A and host B will be forwarded by attacker C, the scenarios 1 and 2 
were simulated successfully. 
 
The ARP caches in hosts A and B are updated continuously, pairs IP and MAC 
addresses can only stay in a certain period of time. Therefore, attacker C needs to send 
forged ARP packets to hosts A and B periodically. 
 
3.3.3 ICMP packets 
 
Hosts in a LAN have to establish communication links with each other before starting 
the actual communications. Depending on who initiates communication, a host needs 
to send a “ping” command to the host that the first wants to communicate with. In this 
simulation, host A sent a “ping” command to host B. The command was captured by 
C.  
 
Host A sent an ICMP request packet which is implemented by “ping” command to 
host B. Within the ICMP request packet, the MAC address of attacker C and IP 
address of host B were used, as shown in Figure 3-10, resulting at the situation where 
this ICMP packet was sent to attacker C. This is because that host A believes that 
attacker C is host B, so any packets which supposed to send to host B send to attacker 
C.  
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Figure 3-10 ICMP request packet from host A 
 
Attacker C received the ICMP packet but host B did not, which is confirmed by 
showing the status of both C and B, as given in Figures 3-11 and 3-12, respectively. 
Compared with Figures 3-11 and 3-12, host B which IP address is 192.168.77.129 did 
not receive any ICMP packets, but attacker C which IP address is 192.168.77.133 
received the ICMP packets from host A. 
 
 
Figure 3-11 Status of host B 
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Figure 3-12 Status of attacker C 
 
After attacker C receiving ICMP request packets from host A, it generated an ICMP 
reply packets, given in Figure 3-13, and sent to host A.  
 
 
 
Figure 3-13 ICMP reply packet generated by C 
 
The difference between this packet and the ICMP request packet from A is that this 
ICMP message is “00 00”, meaning an ICMP reply packet. When host A received the 
ICMP reply packet from attacker C, it believed that a communication link between 
itself and host B is established. The ICMP reply packets received in host A is shown 
in Figure 3-14.  
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Figure 3-14 ICMP packets received by host A 
In Figure 3-14, the ICMP reply packets sent by host C were regarded sent by host B in 
host A, which means host A believed the communication link between host B was 
established, the scenarios 3 was simulated successfully. 
 
3.3.4 Attacking 
 
After successfully becoming Man-in-the-Middle in a LAN, attacker C can capture 
communication packets that host A supposed to send to host B and vice versa. It can 
modify and forward the forged commands to the hosts in the network. It can also 
acquire personal information from the hosts. 
  
As host B is a butler robot of a user, it has an FTP database which stores the important 
information of the user who uses his mobile phone, which is host A, to access the 
database. To let host A have the information, the FTP database set up a password and 
a username for the user and sent to host A with FTP packets. As having become 
Man-in-the-Middle between hosts A and B, attacker C captured the FTP packets and, 
hence, obtained the password and username. 
 
The FTP packets which are captured in attacker C are shown in Figure 3-15. The 
second line in this diagram shows the username “host A”, and the fourth line shows 
the password “1234”.  
  
31 
 
 
Figure 3-15 FTP packets captured by attacker C 
With the username and password, attacker C can pretend it is host A to log in the FTP 
database. It can not only access all personal information of the user stored in the 
database, but also change the information in the database, the scenarios 4 was 
simulated successfully. 
 
3. 4  Summary 
 
This chapter gives details about the implementation of simulated Man-in-the-Middle 
attacks. To demonstrate the dangers of Man-in-the-Middle attack, the simulated 
attacker used ARP reply packet to become Man-in-the-Middle between two hosts A 
and B, used ICMP reply packet to let host A believed the communication link between 
hosts A and B was established, and obtained personal information from A through the 
communication link. 
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CHAPTER 4: CROSS-VALIDATION 
 
 
4. 1 Background 
 
Cross-validation is a method which uses at least two different sets to validate whether 
the user is genuine. This study performs cross-validation among three sets of IP and 
MAC addresses pair: Whitelist obtained from DHCP database, ARP table obtained 
from the existing ARP cache table of hosts and the pairs in ARP reply packets. 
 
Let X be the pairs in ARP reply packet, Y be ARP table and Z be Whitelist. The 
principle of cross-validation is X∩(Y∪Z). 
 
If the IP and MAC addresses pair in ARP reply packet can be found in either Y or Z, 
the computer/smart device that replies ARP request with the ARP reply packet is 
considered genuine. Otherwise, it is regarded as an attacker. 
 
 
4. 2 Cross-Validation to Protect Smart Systems from Man-in-the-Middle Attack  
 
4.2.1 Cross-validation based Man-in-the-Middle attack algorithm 
 
Communications between hosts/computers in a LAN is based on the MAC address of 
the hosts. That is, if a host A wants to communicate with another host B, A must 
obtain host B’s MAC address first. An ARP table is designed for A to obtain B’s MAC 
address, in the case where host B is a registered host in the network, the table contains 
the IP address and MAC address of all registered hosts in the network. A can search 
for host B’s MAC address via B’s IP address, refer to Figure 4-1 where both IP 
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address and MAC address can be seen in the table.  
 
In the case where host B is not registered in the network, host A will broadcast IP 
address to all the hosts in the network using a request packet. Within the packet, there 
are the IP address and FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF for the host that has the same IP address 
to fill in with its MAC address. If a host in the network has the IP address as the same 
as the one in packet, it will replace FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF with its MAC address and 
send to host A. After having received the responds, host A will update its ARP table 
with the MAC address given by the responding host. Host A will then start to 
communicate with that host. The workflow can be seen in Figure 4-2. 
 
It can be seen from the above description that there is little the ARP spoofing attack 
protection to secure communications between hosts in a LAN. An attacker, host C, 
can send a fake ARP reply package to the host A that initiates the communication with 
its own MAC address when having received this reply package, host A with update its 
ARP table by pairing the IP with C’s MAC address suppose the IP address is the IP 
address of the host in the network. Host A will believe that host C is host B. Host C 
can also cheat host B in the same manner. As the result, host A and host B thought 
they communicated with each other, but actually they communicate with host C. The 
latter can give unauthorized commands to the hosts A and B. 
 
 
Figure 4-1 ARP cache table 
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Figure 4-2 The workflow of ARP 
 
To reduce the vulnerability, this study developed a cross-validation based 
Man-in-the-Middle attack protection (CVP) algorithm and introduced it into the 
communication process within LAN. 
 
The algorithm can be described as in Figure 4-3. In this algorithm, whitelist stores the 
IP and MAC addresses pairs of all “live” hosts of a network. When a computer joins 
the network, the Network with assign an IP to the computer and, hence, an IP and 
MAC addresses pair forms. The Network with then update whitelist with the new pair. 
ARP is a local ARP table associated with a host. This table stores IP and MAC 
addresses pairs of all “live” hosts that communicated with the host. In addition, the 
ARP keeps an IP and MAC addresses pair of a host for a short time then the host left 
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the network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3 Cross-validation based Man-in-the-Middle protection algorithm 
Struct whitelist [ ] {       String IP;       String MAC; }; Struct ARP [ ][ ] {      String IP;      String MAC; }; String X ←  IP + MAC; // IP + MAC sent by a new user Whitelist + [ ]  ←  NewWorkARP[ ]; ARP[ ] [n]  ←  Host_n_ARP[ ]; //hostn’s ARP Function Cross− validation( ) { Booled a, b; If(string X = =  whitelist [i])  a ←  TRUE; else{  a ←  FALSE;    { If(string x ==  ARP[j][N])     b ←  TRUE; else b ←  FALSE； }} If ((a = 0)&&(b = 0)) BlackList ←  x; Else ARP[ ][N] update; } 
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The algorithm performs cross-validation among 3 sets of IP and MAC addresses pair. 
That is, if the IP and MAC addresses pair in ARP reply packet can be found in either 
Y or Z, the newly joined computer will be considered genuine. Otherwise, it will be 
regarded as an attacker. The corresponding MAC address will be put into a blacklist, 
which means that the network will not grant this MAC address an IP address so it 
cannot be join the network anymore in the future. 
 
When a new computer, for example, host C with physical address MACC obtain an IP 
address, such as IPC. The pair IPC and MACC will be stored in X and whitelist Z. If 
host C is not cheating, it will use this pair to respond to request packet from any 
existing host, for example, host A. When host A runs the cross-validation, as the same 
pair is in Z, equation (4.1) will return TRUE. Hence, host A can update its ARP with 
the pair and start communication with host C. 
 
If host C is cheating, it will capture the request package and reply with IP address that 
in the request package e.g. IPB and with its own MAC address replacing 
FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF. The pair cannot be in whitelist Z. It cannot be ARP, Y, either this 
is because that this is the first time host A tries to communicate with IPB, otherwise, 
host A would not broadcast IPB. Equation (4.1) will return FALSE. 
 
The reason for including ARP, Y, in the cross-validation is to avoid hasty in putting 
host C into blacklist. In the case where host C joined the network, left and re-joins, all 
in a short period of time, the network would possibly assign two different IP addresses 
to host C, for example, host C had IPB in the first time joining and IPC for the second 
time. Host C may accidentally respond to the request package from where IPB is 
given. Because IPB and MACC stays in host A’s ARP for a short period, though the 
pair is not in whitelist, Equation (4.1) will return TRUE. So host C will not be placed 
in blacklist. 
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This will not jeopardize the security. This is because if host C cheated before, its 
MACC will be in blacklist. Assigning an IP address to MACC is forbidden by the 
network. 
 
4.2.2 Establish Whitelist 
 
The whitelist contains the IP and MAC addresses of all “live” hosts in a network. In a 
LAN, after a host accessing the network, the gateway will distribute an IP address to 
this host, then store the host’s IP and MAC address in a table. The IP and MAC 
addresses of all “live” hosts in the whitelist are gotten from the table stored in the 
gateway. 
 
The IP and MAC addresses pair in the whitelist is an element of cross-validation. 
When a user wants to communicate with other host which running this system in a 
LAN, if this user’s IP and MAC addresses pair can be found in the whitelist, this 
system will check whether it can be found in ARP table. Its algorithm flow chart is 
shown in Figure 4-4. 
 
In this flowchart, this system will read the information of all connected devices after 
accessing the gateway. Within the information, there are device name, MAC address 
and IP address which can be cut by connective. So for obtaining to IP and MAC 
addresses pair, this system will find the two connectives then cut and stores the 
information between the two connectives. 
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Figure 4-4 Whitelist algorithm 
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4.2.3 Establish ARP table  
 
ARP cache table is used for storing IP and MAC addresses pair of existing hosts, 
essentially, it is a corresponding IP address and MAC address table which records the 
other hosts in the network. Each host has its own ARP table. When the host received a 
ARP request packet, it will search this MAC address according to the IP address in its 
ARP cache table firstly, if there is, the host will return the corresponding MAC 
address; if there is not, the host will only send ARP requests enquiries to other host. 
 
ARP cache contains dynamic and static items. Dynamic items are automatically added 
and removed over time. A potential lifetime of each dynamic ARP cache entries is 10 
minutes. New items can be removed from the cache table with a short time, which 
means if a ARP cache entry is not reused within 2 minutes, it will be removed from 
the ARP cache; If a ARP cache is already in use, that is, there are two hosts 
communicate by using this ARP entry in a LAN, it will receive the life cycle of 2 
minutes; If a project is always in use, it will also receive the life cycle of 10 minutes. 
For the static entries, it will remain in the cache until the computer restarted. 
 
When the system is running, the first thing is calling the ARP cache by entering the 
command “arp -a”, then read and stores all of the information in the cache table. In 
this information, every IP and MAC addresses pair is linked with some connectives, 
such as “at” or “on”. So the most important thing to get the IP and MAC addresses 
pair in the ARP table is to find the connectives, that is, the IP and MAC addresses pair 
can be gotten by cutting the information between the connectives. Its algorithm flow 
chart is shown in Figure 4-5. 
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Figure 4-5 ARP table algorithm 
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After entering the command “arp –a” to query the ARP cache table, this system will 
read all the information which contains IP and MAC addresses pair in the table. Then, 
this system will search first connective in the information, if the first connective can 
be found, this system will search the second connective, if the two connectives all can 
be found, the information between the two connectives is the IP and MAC addresses 
pair which can be cut and stored. 
 
 
4. 3 Implementation 
 
The detailed flowchart of the cross-validation algorithm is given in Figure 4-6. 
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Figure 4-6 Cross-validation algorithm 
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“Receive an ARP reply packet” has the function of checking if the host receives an 
ARP reply packet, this was implemented as given in Figure 4-7. This function uses 
Wireshark to check if the host receives an ARP reply packet. Tshark is one function of 
Wireshark which can be used in computer terminal. In this algorithm, system will 
listen and store all ARP packets in computer. 
 
Figure 4-7 Receiving an ARP reply packet function 
 
“Obtain the MAC and IP addresses in the packet” has the function of obtaining MAC 
and IP address pair in ARP packet, this was implemented as given in Figure 4-8. In 
this function, this system opens the file which stores ARP reply packet firstly. Then in 
order to obtain the MAC and IP addresses pair in this packet, this system will cut the 
MAC and IP addresses pair according to the structure of ARP packet, which can be 
found from 22th byte to 32th byte in ARP packet. 
 
Figure 4-8 Obtaining the MAC and IP addresses in the packet function 
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“Establish a database of users with Whitelist and ARP” has the function of 
establishing a database of users with whitelist and ARP table, the whitelist was 
implemented as given in Figure 4-9. In this function, this system will open a file 
which stored the MAC and IP addresses pair of all “live” hosts firstly. Within the file, 
there are MAC and IP addresses of all “live” hosts and some connectives, which link 
MAC and IP addresses. This system will open the file which saved before, then cut 
the information between the two connectives, which can be added in whitelist. 
 
Figure 4-9 Establish a database of users with Whitelist and ARP function 
 
The ARP table was implemented as show in Figure 4-10. In this function, this system 
will query the ARP cache table by entering “arp –a” command in computer terminal 
firstly. Because every time the ARP cache table is queried, it will be saved as a file 
automatically. Within the file, there are MAC and IP addresses of all communicated 
hosts and some connectives, such as “at”, “on”. This system will open the file which 
saved before, then cut the information depends on the connectives, which can be 
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added in ARP.  
 
Figure 4-10 ARP table implementation 
 
“Match with the MAC and IP addresses in whitelist and ARP” has the function of 
checking the reliability of new user, “Add this MAC address Blacklist” and “Update 
the ARP cache table” are the result of running this block. This was implemented as 
shown in Figure 4-11. In this function, the MAC and IP addresses pair of new user is 
compared with in the whitelist and ARP table. If the result is FALSE, which means 
this new user is an attacker, and then adds this new user into blacklist. If the result is 
TRUE, which means it can be found one same pair in whitelist or ARP table, this 
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system will update the ARP table with the MAC and IP addresses pair of the new user. 
 
Figure 4-11 Matching with the MAC and IP addresses in whitelist and ARP function 
 
 
4. 4 Summary  
 
This chapter gives details about cross-validation to protect smart systems from ARP 
Spoofing attack method. In order to implement this method, this study established a 
whitelist which contains the MAC and IP addresses pair of all “live” hosts and an 
ARP table which contains the MAC and IP addresses pair of all communicated hosts 
as standards of cross-validation. The main idea to protect smart systems from ARP 
spoofing attack is to check every MAC and IP addresses pair in ARP packet, that is, 
whether it can be found in whitelist and ARP table. The implementation of this 
method written in the C++ programming language, the test of this method is given in 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: SIMULATION AND EVALUATION 
 
 
5. 1 Aim and Environment 
 
After implementing the cross-validation based method to protect smart systems from 
Man-in-the-Middle attacks as mentioned in Chapter 4, this chapter gives the details of 
a simulation in order to evaluate the proposed method in terms of protecting the 
network from Man-in-the-Middle attacks. During this simulation, the three functions 
were evaluated: Whitelist, ARP table and Cross-validation.  
 
The aim of this simulation is to prove the effectiveness of the proposed 
cross-validation based method in protecting LANs from Man-in-the-Middle attacks. 
The expected results include:  
1. The MAC and IP addresses pairs in the Whitelist of all “live” hosts are the 
same as the ones in a DHCP database, meaning Whitelist established correctly. 
2. The MAC and IP addresses pair newly added to ARP table is the same as in 
the current pair in ARP cache table, meaning ARP table established correctly. 
3. The ARP cache table does not update after Man-in-the-Middle attack, meaning 
the attack failed. 
The achievement of the expected result one indicates attack simulation scenarios 1 
and 2 will be prevented. The achievement of the expected results 2 and 3 means the 
protection of LANs from being affected as simulated in scenario 3.  
 
The environment of this simulation was set up as follows: 
The system: Windows 7, Linux. 
The hardware: Three hosts. 
The network topology is shown in Figure 5-1. 
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Figure 5-1 The network topology 
 
Host A and host B are two normal users in the network, host C is an attacker that 
wants to launch Man-in-the-Middle attacks. The MAC addresses of the three hosts are 
shown in Table 5-1.  
Table 5-1 Mac addresses of the hosts 
Host Name MAC address 
Host A 00-0C-29-30-DE-BF 
Host B 00-0C-29-07-6F-0F 
Host C 00-0C-29-96-FF-82 
 
The proposed cross-validation based method to protect smart systems from 
Man-in-the-Middle attacks were used in both hosts A and B. 
 
The reasons for establishing this environmental setting are： 
1. This environment is similar to the real LAN. The aim of cross-validation to 
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protect smart systems from Man-in-the-Middle attack method is that protect 
smart systems in a LAN, so the environment is closer to the LAN, the results 
of simulation are more realistic. 
2. This environment meets the minimum requirements of simulation. This 
simulation requires that there are at least two hosts as normal users and one 
host as attacker.  
3. The software and hardware are universal.  
 
 
5. 2 Establishment of Whitelist 
 
Dynamic Host Configure Protocol（DHCP）is a LAN protocol, which issues IP 
addresses to hosts in a LAN. When a host wants to access the network, the network 
picks up IP address from DHCP database and assigns it to the host. There are three 
ways to assign IP address: 
1. Automatic allocation. When a host has gotten an IP address from DHCP 
database, it will always use this IP address to access the network. 
2. Dynamic allocation. An IP address will be assigned to a host when it access 
the network and re-assigned to other hosts after the host left the network. 
3. Manual allocation. The IP addresses will be assigned by network 
administrator. 
 
DHCP was used to issue dynamic IP addresses to hosts, that is, an IP address will be 
assigned to a host and re-assigned to the other host after the host leaving the network. 
The keys are the range of IP addresses and max lease time. The range of IP addresses 
in this simulated network is from 192.168.1.128 to 192.168.1.255, which means every 
host’s IP address must be in this range. The max lease time is about six days, which 
means the IP addresses of connecting host will be changed after six days.  
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If a host accesses the network and is assigned with an IP address from DHCP database, 
a lease file will be created which contains the information of connected hosts in 
DHCP database. This lease file contains information, such as the connected host’s IP 
address which was assigned from DHCP database and the host’s MAC address. 
Figure 5-2 gives an example showing a host with MAC address 00-0C-29-30-DE-BF 
(Line 1) is assigned with IP address 00:0c:29:30:de:bf (Line 6) and is connected to the 
network. 
 
 
Figure 5-2 Information in lease file 
 
The Whitelist used in the proposed cross-validation based method to protect smart 
systems from Man-in-the-Middle attacks contains the MAC and IP addresses pairs of 
all “live” hosts and is able to update itself whenever a host becomes “alive”. To 
establish such as Whitelist, dynamic allocation was used. The configuration file is 
given in Figure 5-3.  
 
One of the expected results is to have the MAC and IP addresses pairs in a Whitelist 
are the same as in DHCP database. The lease file which stores the information of the 
three hosts in DHCP is shown in Figure 5-4. In this diagram, there are three hosts 
have connected to this network with their MAC and IP addresses. 
 
The Whitelist of host A generated in this simulation is shown in Figure 5-5. The 
obtained Whitelist contains the MAC and IP addresses pairs of three “live” hosts, 
which means the three hosts are now in this network. Comparing Figures 5-4 and 5-5, 
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it can be found that IP and MAC addresses pairs in DHCP are the same as those that 
are in the Whitelists.  
 
 
Figure 5-3 Whitelist configuration 
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Figure 5-4 Connected hosts information 
 
 
Figure 5-5 The result of simulating whitelist 
 
 
5. 3 ARP Table  
 
The ARP table of a host stores the MAC and IP addresses pairs of all “live” hosts 
which have previously communicated with the host. The ARP table is used to validate 
whether the host is genuine.  
 
The MAC and IP address pairs in an ARP table are obtained from the ARP cache table. 
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ARP cache table of host A which runs the cross-validation based method to protect 
smart systems from Man-in-the-Middle attack is shown in Figure 5-6. There are two 
“live” hosts in the ARP cache table. The two hosts have previously communicated 
with host A. In this diagram. 192.168.1.198 and 00-0C-29-07-6F-0F in the second line 
are the MAC and IP addresses of host B. The other host is the gateway with its MAC 
and IP addresses pair as given in the bottom line. 
 
 
Figure 5-6 ARP cache table of host A 
 
To form IP and MAC pairs and add them into ARP table, ARP table algorithm as 
mentioned in the previous chapter first looked for connectives, “at” and “on” in the 
ARP cache table. These connectives lead to MAC and IP addresses of a host, 
respectively. The algorithm of ARP table searched for “at” from the ARP cache table 
and took the IP address before “at”. It searched for “on” and took MAC address 
before “on”. The algorithm then used the MAC and IP addresses to form the pairs and 
stored them in ARP table which is shown in Figure 5-7. 
 
 
Figure 5-7 ARP table obtained from the ARP cache table of host A 
 
 
5. 4 Cross-validation 
 
The cross-validation based method checks whether the MAC and IP addresses pairs in 
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ARP packet are genuine, that is, it can find them in Whitelist and ARP table. 
 
Simulations are given as follows: 
Host A broadcasted an ARP request packet which is shown in Figure 5-8 to request 
the MAC address of the host that holds that IP address. Within the packet, there are an 
IP address of the host to which host A wants to communicate and FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF 
for the host o fill in with its MAC address. In this simulation, host A wants to 
communicate with host B but it did not know host B’s MAC address.  
 
 
Figure 5-8 ARP request packet host A broadcasted 
 
The ARP cache table of host A before broadcasting sending the ARP request packet is 
shown in Figure 5-9. In this diagram, there is only one pair of 192.168.1.2 (IP address) 
and 00-50-56-FD-EE-29 (MAC address), meaning host A has previously 
communicated with that host. The host is the gateway of the network.  
 
 
Figure 5-9 The ARP cache table of host A before broadcasting the ARP request packet 
 
Every host in this LAN can receive this ARP request packet. When host B received 
the ARP request packet from host A, it sent an ARP reply packet with its MAC and IP 
addresses to host A.  
 
Host A checked whether the MAC and IP addresses pair in the ARP reply packet from 
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host B is genuine by running cross-validation. The cross-validation algorithm as given 
in Section 4.3 compared the MAC and IP addresses pair of host B with the ones in its 
Whitelist and ARP table. Refer to the Figure 5-5, the MAC and IP addresses pair of 
host B was found in Whitelist, which means host B is a genuine host. Cross-validation 
then updated host A’s ARP cache table with host B’s MAC and IP addresses as given 
in Figure 5-10. 192.168.1.198 is the IP address of host B, 00-0C-29-07-6F-0F is the 
MAC address of host B. 
 
 
Figure 5-10 ARP cache table of host A updating 
 
The ARP cache table of host A after receiving ARP reply packet from host B became 
the one as shown in Figure 5-11. Compared with the ARP cache table before receiving 
ARP reply packet, there is one more MAC and IP addresses pair added. This is host 
B’s MAC and IP addresses pair which is in the fourth line of Figure 5-10, which 
means host A can start to communicate with host B. 
 
 
Figure 5-11 ARP cache table of host A after receiving ARP reply packet from host B 
 
Host C also received the ARP request packet from host A. As an attacker, host C 
initiated a Man-in-the-Middle attack to host A by sending an ARP reply packet which 
is shown in Figure 5-12. Within this ARP reply packet, the MAC address is host C’s 
and the IP address is host B’s. In this diagram, 00-0C-29-96-FF-82 is the MAC 
address of host C in the first line, the IP address of host B is shown in hexadecimal 
which is C0-A8-01-80 in the third line. 
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Figure 5-12 ARP reply packet from attacker (host C) 
 
When host A received the ARP reply packet sending from host C, the MAC and IP 
addresses pair in the packet was checked in the same way as the ARP reply packet 
from host B. But the pair could not be found in Whitelist and in ARP table, refer to 
Figures 5-5 and 5-7, the IP address 192.168.1.198 (host B’s IP address) has assigned 
to the host which MAC address is 00-0C-29-07-6F-0F (host B’s MAC address), it 
cannot belong to the host which MAC address is 00-0C-29-96-FF-82 (host C’s MAC 
address). This is means host C is recognized as an attacker, t cross-validation added 
host C’s MAC address in blacklist as shown in Figure 5-13.  
 
 
Figure 5-13 The result of receiving a forged ARP reply packet from host C 
 
The ARP cache table of host A which is shown in Figure 5-14 was not updated, in 
another word, it was the same as the one before receiving the ARP reply packet from 
host C. This can be seen by comparing with Figure 5-11, the ARP cache table of host 
A after receiving ARP reply packet from host B.  
 
 
Figure 5-14 The ARP cache table of host A after receiving the ARP reply packet from 
attacker C 
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5. 5 Summary 
 
This chapter implemented the simulation of the cross-validation based method to 
protect smart systems from Man-in-the-Middle attacks. The simulation shows the 
effectiveness of the proposed method in the sense of protecting from 
Man-in-the-Middle attacks.  
1. The ARP cache table is updated only when the cross-validation proves that the 
host from which an ARP reply packet is received is genuine. The host to which 
this method is applied only updates its cache in the case where the 
cross-validation can find the MAC and IP addresses pair in ARP reply packets 
in Whitelist or ARP table. 
2. All ARP reply packets are checked in hosts. When a host receives an ARP 
reply packet, it runs cross-validation to check the MAC and IP addresses pair 
in the packet. This avoids the acceptance of IP and MAC pairs from ARP 
attackers.  
3. ARP attackers’ MAC addresses are placed in a blacklist to prevent further 
attacks from these attackers. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK 
 
6. 1 Conclusion 
 
 
This research aims at the development of a cross-validation based Man-in-the-Middle 
attack protection (CVP) method. The method enables the hosts that initialise 
communications to check whether responding hosts are genuine by looking at the 
ARP reply packets sending back from those hosts. It allows the ARP cache table of 
the initialising hosts to be updated with the MAC address and IP address pairs of the 
genuine hosts and to place the MAC address of inauthentic hosts into a blacklist. The 
following work has been done: 
1. Simulating Man-in-the-Middle attack to reflect the damages it can impose to 
smart systems. The simulated attacker used ARP packets to become 
“Man-in-the-Middle”, and then captured and modified the packets to obtain 
the personal information from the simulated hosts. 
2. Establishing a Whitelist and an ARP table to store the MAC and IP addresses 
pairs. Whitelist was established to store the MAC and IP addresses pairs of all 
“live” hosts which were obtained from lease file of DHCP. The MAC and IP 
addresses pairs of all “live” hosts which communicated previously in ARP 
table were obtained from host’s ARP cache table.  
3. Implementing the cross-validation to check whether the ARP packet is genuine. 
To ensure that the ARP packet is genuine, the cross-validation checked 
whether the MAC and IP address pairs in ARP packets can be found in 
Whitelist and ARP table, and then allowed the ARP cache table to update or 
added the pair of the ARP packet in Blacklist based on whether the ARP 
packet is genuine. 
4. Setting up a simulation environment to prove the effectiveness of the proposed 
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cross-validation based method in protecting network from ARP attacks. The 
ARP cache table of host which used CVP method did not update after 
Man-in-the-Middle attack, which means this method can prevent 
Man-in-the-Middle attack. 
 
The simulation results presented in this dissertation show: 
1. Man-in-the-Middle attack can be implemented by sending ARP packet. After 
sending ARP packet, the attacker becomes “Man-in-the-Middle”, and then can 
capture and modify packets to attack. 
2. The cross-validation proves that the host from which an ARP packet is 
received is genuine, and then allows the ARP cache table of the host to update. 
3. The cross-validation also proves that the attacker from which an ARP forged 
packet is received is inauthentic, which means the MAC and IP addresses pair 
in the packet cannot be found in Whitelist and ARP table, and then adds the 
MAC and IP addresses pair of the forged ARP packet to Blacklist. 
 
Compared with the existing Man-in-the-Middle attack protection methods, the 
proposed CVP method has the following advantages: 
1. No extra devices is needed and no changes is necessary in the existing LANs, 
2. Low cost resultant from 1, 
3. More secure due to the use of blacklist which contains the MAC address of 
attackers,  
4. No administrator is required because of the automated process of adding new 
hosts to networks of the proposed cross-validation. 
 
 
6. 2 Further Work 
 
This research aims at developing a cross-validation based Man-in-the-Middle attack 
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protection which can be used in smart systems. Apart from Man-in-the-Middle attacks, 
there are other ARP attacks such as MAC flooding attacks and IP conflict attacks. 
CVP method is not validated for protection networks from those ARP attacks. There is 
a need for different approaches to be designed to prevent those ARP attacks. 
 
DHCP is used to issue IP addresses to the hosts in network and create a lease file 
which contains the same MAC and IP addresses pairs with in the Whitelist. Every 
host, include the attacker, can obtain an IP address from the DHCP. In further work, 
permission information such as a key word can be used in CVP method. In the case 
where the host has the permission information, the DHCP issues the IP address to it, 
which can further reduce the cost of CVP method and make a more secure network. 
 
In some situations, the attacker can send a large number of ARP reply packets to 
influence the rate of network communication. Though the attacker is not genuine, 
after being checked by CVP method in hosts, the attacker aims at implementing 
network congestion instead of becoming “Man-in-the-Middle” or launching other 
ARP attacks. This method is used in hosts now, to improving the speed of network 
transmission in LANs, this method can be used in the router in the future to check 
whether the host from which receives the ARP reply packet is genuine, and then the 
router only forwards the ARP reply packets which are from genuine hosts. 
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APPENDIX: 
 
Main.cpp #include < iostream > #include "PermissionManager. hpp"  int main(int argc, const char ∗  argv[]) {     PermissionManager(). run();     return 0; } 
 
PeimissionMangager.hpp #ifndef PermissionManager_hpp #define PermissionManager_hpp  #include < stdio. h > #include "UserInfoDtabase. hpp" #include "SystemNetworkManager. hpp" #include < string >  class PermissionManager { public:      void run();     PermissionManager();     bool havePermissionForIPMacAddress(char ∗);   } private:     int choice; 
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    SystemNetworkManager ∗ systemNetworkManager;          void searchstoreARPpacket();     void displayvalidatedresultt(); };  
PeimissionMangager.cpp #include "PermissionManager. hpp" #include < iostream > 
 void PermissionManager: : run() {     while (1) {         cout <<  "\nwelcome to network manager, please select a number\n";         cout <<  "1. serchstoreARPpacket\n";         cout <<  "2. displayvalidatedresult\n";         cin >>  choice;  (choice) {             case 1:                 this−> searchstoreARPpacket();                 break;                 case 2:                 this−> displayvalidatedresult();                 break;                                        default:                 break;         }         choice =  0; 
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    } } 
 void PermissionManager: : searchstoreARPpacket() {     this−> systemNetworkManager−> searchstoreARPpacket(); } void PermissionManager: : displayvalidatedresult() { UserInfoDatabse: : sharedDatabase()−> displayvalidatedresult(); } 
 bool PermissionManager
∷ havePermissionForIPMacAddress(char ∗ ipmacAddress) {     bool result =  UserInfoDatabse ∷ sharedDatabase()−> haveMacIPAddress(ipmacAddress);     return result; } 
 
SystemNetworkManager.hpp #ifndef SystemNetworkManager_hpp #define SystemNetworkManager_hpp  #include < stdio. h >  class SystemNetworkManager { public:     void addMACIPinARP();     void addMACIPinwhitelist();     void getMACIPofnewUser(); 
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    void serchstoreARPpacket(); };  
SystemNetworkManager.cpp #include "SystemNetworkManage. hpp" #include < iostream > #include < string > #include "UserInfoDtabase. hpp"  using namespace std; void SystemNetworkManager: : addMACIPinARP() {     char cmd[10]  =  "arp − a";     char result[1024];     char buf_ps[1024];     FILE ∗ ptr;     if ((ptr = _popen(cmd, "r")) ! =  NULL) {         while (fgets(buf_ps, 1024, ptr) ! =  NULL) {             strcat_s(result, buf_ps);             if (strlen(result) > 1024) {                 break;             }         }         _pclose(ptr);         ptr =  NULL;     } else {         cout <<  "popen" <<  cmd <<  "error\n";     }          const char ∗ split =  "\n"; 
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    char ∗ p;     p =  strtok(result, split); while (p! = NULL) {         string stringTemp =  p;         size_t atPos =  stringTemp. find("at ");         size_t onPos =  stringTemp. find("on ");         unsigned long macclipCount =  onPos −  atPos −  9;         string mac =  stringTemp. substr(atPos + 1, clipCount);         string ip =  stringTemp. substr(3, atPos− 1);         strcat(string ip, string mac);         string macIPStart =  macIP. substr(0,1);         if (macIPStart. compare("(") ! =  0) {             char ∗macIPChar =  (char ∗)macIP. c_str();             cout <<  macIPChar <<  "\n";         UserInfoDatabase: : sharedDatabase()−> addIPMacAddresInARP(macIPChar);         }         p =  strtok(NULL, split);     } }  void SystemNetworkManager: : addMACIPinwhitelist(){ fstream infile("dhcpd. lease", ios: : in|ios: : nocreate) char ∗ x;     x =  strtok(result, split);          while (x! = NULL) {         string stringTemp =  x;         size_t leasePos =  stringTemp. find("lease "); 
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        size_t startsPos =  stringTemp. find("starts ");         size_t ethernetPos =  stringTemp. find("ethernet ");         size_t clientPos =  stringTemp. find("client ");         unsigned long ipclipCount =  lease Pos −  startsPos −  3;         unsigned long macclipCount =  ethernet Pos −  clientPos −  3;         string ip =  stringTemp. substr(leasePos + 3, ipclipCount);         string mac =  stringTemp. substr(ethernetPos + 3, macclipCount);         strcat(string IP, string mac);         string macIPStart =  macIP. substr(0,1);         if (macIPStart. compare("(") ! =  0) {             char ∗macIPChar =  (char ∗)macIP. c_str();             cout <<  macIPChar <<  "\n";         UserInfoDatabse: : sharedDatabase()−> addMACIPInWhitelist(macIPChar);         }         x =  strtok(NULL, split);     } } 
 void systemnetworkManager: : getMACIPofnewUser(){ struct newUseripmac { char IPMAC[10]; }; fstream infile("ARPPacket. txt", ios: : in|ios: : nocreate); newUseripmac data[10]; cout << sizeof(data[0]) << endl; for(int i = 0; i < 10; i + +) { 
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infile. seekg(i ∗ 32, ios: : beg); infile. seekg(22, ios: : cur); infile. read((char ∗)&data[i], sizeof(data[0])); cout << data[i]. IPMAC[10] << << endl; fin. close(); } } 
 
UserInfoDtabase.hpp #ifndef UserInfoDtabase_hpp #define UserInfoDtabase_hpp  #include < stdio. h >  class UserInfoDatabse { public:     static UserInfoDatabse ∗ sharedDatabase();     bool haveIPMacAddress(char ∗);     void displayvalidatedresult();      protected:     char ∗  ipmacAddresArray[100];      private:     UserInfoDatabse();     UserInfoDatabse(const UserInfoDatabse&);     static UserInfoDatabse ∗m_databse; }; 
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UserInfoDtabase.cpp #include "UserInfoDtabase. hpp" #include < iostream > using namespace std; #define ARRAY_LENGTH 20  static int arrayIndex =  0; 
 UserInfoDatabse: : UserInfoDatabse(const UserInfoDatabse&) { } UserInfoDatabse ∗ UserInfoDatabse: : m_databse =  new UserInfoDatabse(); UserInfoDatabse ∗ UserInfoDatabse: : sharedDatabase() {     return m_databse; } 
 void UserInfoDatabse: : displayvalidatedresult(char ∗ ipmacAddress) { string ipmacAddressString =  ipmacAddress;         cout << "add  into blacklist with    " <<  newUseripmac <<  \n;  }   for (int i =  0;  i <  arrayIndex;  i + +) {         string newUseripmac =  ipmacAddresArray[i];         if (ipmacAddressString. compare(newUseripmac)  ==  0) {          cout << "update ARP cache table with   " <<  newUseripmac <<  \n; }  return 0; }  
  
74 
bool UserInfoDatabse: : haveIPMacAddress(char ∗ ipmacAddress) { string ipmacAddressString =  ipmacAddress; UserInfoDatabase ∷ sharedDatabase() → addMACIPInBlacklist(newUseripmac);  cout << "add  into blacklist with  " <<  newUseripmac <<  "\n"; bool result =  FALSE;     for (int i =  0;  i <  arrayIndex;  i + +) {         string newUseripmac =  ipmacAddresArray[i];         if (ipmacAddressString. compare(newUseripmac)  ==  0) {             result =  TRUE;  system("arp – s newUseripmac ");  cout << "update ARP cache table  with  " << newUseripmac <<  "\n";         }     }     return result; }  
  
 
  
